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Abstract: During the last decades, the policies of trade liberalization and export 
promotion have been crucial to Central America's economic growth. Because 
of the linkages between trade and the environment, this dramatic shift in 
Central America’s trade patterns could have important implications for the 
environment and use of natural resources. This paper looks at the dynamics 
between trade and the environment in the Central American region during the 
decade of the 1990s, focusing on export flows with its main partner, the 
United States. By making use of relevant econometric techniques, such as 
instrumental variables and fixed effect estimation, in order to address problems 
caused by the endogeneity of environmental policy and unobserved country 
characteristics, we found evidence supporting the existence of a pollution 
haven effect. These results show that after controlling for other factors that 
influence trade flows more stringent environmental regulation acts as a 
deterrent to dirty good production. 
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1.	  Introduction	  
 
 Trade liberalization is usually seen as a way of stimulating economic growth in 
developing countries. However, along with the potential benefits that this policy can bring 
it is also important to assess whether such initiatives can lead to negative outcomes for the 
environment. During recent years the subject of the environmental consequences of trade 
liberalization has become a topic of increasing concern which has also called for ample 
debate. In the Americas, this debate started since the early 1990's when the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) allowed for the direct competition between 
companies located in high income and strongly regulated countries, such as the United 
States (US) and Canada, and companies located in a lower income and weakly regulated 
country, such as Mexico. Critics of this treaty pointed to the difference in environmental 
control costs across countries, and the already poor environmental record in the 
Maquiladora sector in Mexico, to argue that NAFTA was on the way to become an 
environmental disaster for Mexico and a jobs disaster for the US and Canada (Grossman & 
Krueger, 1994). Thus, the economic literature related to these issues was stimulated by the 
policy debates of these past two decades. A large part of the recent work focuses on policy 
analysis through testing hypotheses about the dynamics of trade, growth and the 
environment.  
  
 In the last decades, countries from the Central American region have searched for 
growth and development through their inclusion in the world’s economy. The policies of 
trade liberalization and export promotion have been crucial to Central America's current 
economic development. To this end, the region has pursued an approach to gradually 
reduce trade barriers and increase the outward orientation of the economy. This process of 
liberalization occurred initially under the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), which 
called for the adoption of policies based on the Washington Consensus. The ultimate goal 
of this set of policies was to promote economic stability and, in turn, stimulate the 
reallocation of resources toward the export sector. These policies were complemented by 
incentive programs for the promotion and diversification of non-traditional exports 
(Desruelle & Schipke, 2008). 
  
 Because of the linkages between trade and the environment, this dramatic shift in 
Central America’s trade patterns could have important implications for the environment 
and use of natural resources. Although the precise environmental impacts of the different 
trade liberalization programs undertaken are often difficult to estimate, an analysis of the 
dynamics of trade in the region could give us a broad understanding of the environmental 
implications of greater economic openness. This could provide useful guidance for 
incorporating environmental concerns in economic policy making. For example, trade may 
encourage a relocation of polluting industries from countries with strict environmental 
policy to those with less strict policy. These shifts may additionally increase global pollution 
or they may have a negative effect on environmental policy formulation, as countries will 
not be willing to strengthen their environmental standards in order to avoid losing 
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competitiveness. Here is where the issue of the environmental impact of trade liberalization 
comes to play. 
  
 A key question of this study will be whether the significant acceleration of Central 
American economic growth under trade liberalization and other structural reforms since 
the 1990s has led to environmental improvements, as argued by advocates of trade and 
investment liberalization, or whether, as maintained by many environmentalists, has 
occurred at the expense of the environment. 
  
 Two central hypotheses have been derived from this debate. The first,  referred to 
as the pollution haven hypothesis, states that increasing trade may promote that developing 
countries with lax environmental standards will specialize in the production of high 
polluting goods. In contrast, the factor endowment hypothesis, predicts that the liberalization of 
trade will lead to trade patterns consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) theory of 
comparative advantage, and thus, based on factor endowment differentials without 
influence of environmental regulations (Copeland & Taylor, 2004).  
  
 Early studies on the link of trade and the environment have concluded that there is 
little connection between the stringency of environmental regulation and trade flows. 
Nevertheless, more recent work suggests that there could be some issues with these 
studies' estimation approach that may have led to these results, such as the endogeneity of 
pollution abatement costs and unobserved country characteristics. Therefore, by making 
use of econometric techniques like instrumental variables and fixed effect estimation to 
address the problems caused by endogeneity and unobserved characteristics, this later 
group of work has found some evidence supporting the existence of a pollution haven effect. 
This evidence shows that after controlling for other factors that influence trade and 
investment flows more stringent environmental regulation acts as a deterrent to dirty good 
production. Our study will follow this same line of work by making use of the appropriate 
econometric techniques to account for endogeneity and unobserved characteristics.  
  
 This paper then aims to contribute to this recent literature by evaluating the 
implications that environmental policy has had on trade flows during the initial period of 
liberalization that took place in the Central American Region (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) and Dominican Republic during the 1990s (1990–
1999). Our theoretical framework builds upon the standard models used in the study of 
international trade and the environment, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin model, Copeland 
and Taylor’s (1994) model, and the Gravity model. From this, we derive an econometric 
approach which as mentioned, in line with the later group of empirical work, will make use 
of fixed effects and instrumental variables estimation in order to account for the problems 
of endogeneity and unobserved characteristics mentioned in the literature.   
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2.	  Theory	  
 
 This section addresses the basic theories and models that will be used throughout 
this paper and provides the foundation for the analysis of trade and environmental 
regulations.  
2.1	  International	  Trade	  and	  the	  Environment	  
 
 The theory of international trade is concerned with the structure of trade, 
specifically which goods are either exported or imported by each country and the reason 
behind this patterns. It also looks at the gains from trade and how are these distributed, at 
the determination of relative prices, the process of international specialization, and the 
consequences on the domestic patterns of consumption and production (O'Brien & 
Williams, 2007). 
Heckscher-­‐Ohlin	  Model	  
  
 When we look at the traditional theory of international trade we can identify one 
essential model that has been used as the foundation for explaining the dynamics of 
international trade and the environment: the Heckscher-Ohlin theory. The Heckscher-
Ohlin theory provides an explanation for the pattern of production and trade that results 
when countries have different endowments of factors of production, such as capital, 
labour, and land. The central message concerning trade patterns is that countries tend to 
export goods that are intensive in the factors with which they are abundantly endowed. An 
important implication of this is that trade has an effect on the relative earnings of factors, 
and thus, it tends to lead to the equalization of prices of factors across countries. This is 
demonstrated using a relative supply and relative demand analysis that shows that the 
country with a relatively abundant endowment of a certain factor will produce the good 
that uses that factor more cheaply than the other country (O'Brien & Williams, 2007). 
  
 As mentioned, the study of international trade and the environment has been based 
in the Heckscher-Ohlin model by using a similar approach, in which international trade is 
explained by differences in the environmental policy of countries, states, or regions. 
Copeland and Taylor (1994) analysed the issue by using applied theory in what is 
considered a seminal work in the trade and environment literature. They develop a two 
country static general equilibrium model of international trade with a range of goods 
differentiated by their pollution intensity. In this model, there is only one primary factor of 
production, human capital, and for the most part the authors assume countries only differ 
in their endowment of this factor. The focus is on how differences in human capital across 
countries affects their income, regulation, and resulting trade flows and pollution levels. A 
review of this model will provide the foundation for our study and will set the stage for our 
survey of the empirical literature. 
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Copeland	  and	  Taylor’s	  Model	  	  
 
 In their paper, Copeland and Taylor (1994) examine the effects of trade on the 
environment in a small open economy facing fixed world prices in order to emphasize 
three major points: a) that a country’s characteristics, while helping to define its 
comparative advantage, determine the effect of trade liberalization on the environment; 
and therefore, not all countries will have the same results; b) that the effects of trade on the 
environment will also be contingent on whether environmental regulation is rigid or if it 
adjusts to the changes brought about by trade; c) that the welfare effects of trade 
liberalization differ as well, base on both a country’s comparative advantage and the 
flexibility of its policy regime. In addition, the authors also look at a two-region model to 
evaluate two of the major hypotheses that relate country characteristics to the environment; 
these are the factor endowments hypothesis and the pollution haven hypothesis. 
  
 Copeland and Taylor (1994) explain that before trade liberalization, two types of 
distortions are present in the economy, trade barriers and an inefficient pollution policy. 
The consequences of having a weak pollution policy can either be reduced or aggravated by 
the reduction in trade barriers. Therefore, the standard gains predicted from trade theories 
do not really apply. As such, in order to examine the welfare effects of trade liberalization, 
these authors propose to consider a different model in which we can evaluate the effects of 
a small fall in the trade friction (δ) on the utility of a representative consumer. 
  
 For this, the authors assume that there are N identical consumers in the economy, 
with each consumer maximizing utility and treating pollution as a given. Preferences over 
consumption goods are homothetic and the utility function is separable with respect to 
consumption goods and environmental quality. Based on this, the indirect utility function 
for a typical consumer would be: 
 𝑉 𝑝, 𝐼, 𝑧 = 𝑣 𝐼𝛽 𝑝 − ℎ(𝑧)	  
 
where z represents pollution emissions, h is increasing and convex, , I is per capita income, 
β is a price index, and v is increasing and concave. Pollution is damaging to all consumers 
and is treated as a pure public bad, thus, all consumers experience the same level of 
pollution. 
  
 For modelling purposes, they capture the effects of increased opportunities to trade 
by assuming that there are some trade frictions between countries that can be reduced. 
This is done by assuming that trade consumes real resources, and the amount of trade 
frictions increase as δ rises. Therefore, an importer who wants to receive one unit of X 
from the foreign country has to ship (1+δ) units because δ is lost in transport. Trading 
costs contribute to the disparity of domestic and foreign price of a good. So if we let p 
denote the world price of X, then the price of X for an importing country is: 
 𝑝!! = 𝑝 1 + 𝜕 	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On the other hand, in the case that home exports X, to deliver a unit of X to a foreign 
market (where the price is p), a home exporter must send (1+δ) units, which are acquired 
locally at the domestic price 𝑝!!. Thus, the domestic price is lower than the foreign price: 
 𝑝!! = 𝑝1 + 𝜕 	  
  
 How this price compares to the world price depends on the country’s comparative 
advantage. So based on the indirect utility function for a typical consumer, and after further 
manipulation, we replace p with 𝑝! and differentiate to obtain: 
 𝑑𝑉𝑉! = −𝑀𝑑𝑝! + (𝜏 −𝑀𝐷)𝑑𝑧	  
 
where MD is a representative consumer’s marginal damage from pollution, or the marginal 
rate of substitution between pollution and income; and τ is a price that firms face for each 
unit of emissions that they release. This price may be implemented with an emissions tax 
for example.  
  
 According to Copeland and Taylor (1994), trade liberalization will have two effects 
on welfare: 1) the standard gains from increased trade, and 2) the consequent change in the 
environment. Both importers and exporters will see positive gains from trade, since if 
Home imports X, then M > 0 and the domestic price of X falls with trade liberalization, 
and then, 𝑀𝑑𝑝! < 0. If Home exports X, then M < 0 but the domestic price of X rises 
with trade liberalization, but once again we find 𝑀𝑑𝑝! < 0. 
 The authors note, however, that changes in pollution can reduce the benefits of 
trade liberalization. For example, when emission intensities are constant and regulation is 
lax (τ  -­‐  MD), if home exports X, pollution rises with trade. Since the pollution tax is lower 
than the marginal damage, the increased pollution would lower welfare (τ   -­‐MD)   dz<0 . 
Therefore, the net welfare effect of liberalization is in this case ambiguous. One would 
have to compare the costs of greater pollution with the benefits of increased goods 
consumption. Instead, if home imports X, trade liberalization can both decrease pollution 
and generate increased consumption. Once again, with lax pollution regulation  (τ   -­‐  MD), 
the economy would gain from reduced pollution and the standard gains from trade. In 
addition, the policy instruments that are used also have an important role in defining the 
welfare effects of trade liberalization. For example, if pollution regulation is in the form of 
a binding aggregate pollution quota, then increased trade would always lead to higher 
welfare, even if marginal damage is high and pollution regulation is weak. This is because 
with a binding pollution quota, pollution does not change with trade liberalization, and in 
this case, we would have (τ  -­‐MD)  dz=0, which would leave us only the standard gains from 
trade (Copeland & Taylor, 1994). 
 So, the conclusion brought by Copeland and Taylor (1994) is that if environmental 
regulations are not responsive then the welfare effects of trade liberalization will vary 
according to the pattern of trade, the kind of policy instrument used, and the stringency of 
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pollution regulation already in place. One can see this, for example, in the case that the 
number of pollution permits is kept constant during trade liberalization, then trade would 
end up raising welfare with no additional environmental consequences. On the other hand, 
if pollution is regulated based on emission intensities and these are unchanged with trade, 
then trade would lead to increase pollution in countries with a comparative advantage in 
dirty goods, and decreases it in countries with a comparative advantage in clean goods. In 
this way, in cases on which pollution policy does not completely internalize externalities, 
countries with a comparative advantage in dirty goods may end up losing from trade. 
The	  Determinants	  of	  Comparative	  advantage	  
 
 An important subject in the literature on the effects of trade on the environment 
has been to look at what type of countries attract dirty industries when trade is liberalized. 
This is because a country’s characteristics, or more specifically, its comparative advantage 
helps to determine the composition effect of trade liberalization, which in general plays a 
key role on the final outcome (Cunha & Muthukumara, 2011).   
 The literature presents two basic theories. One is the pollution haven hypothesis, 
which states that countries with relatively weak environmental policy, usually seen as low 
income countries, will specialize in production of dirty goods. On the other hand, an 
opposing view is that trade patterns are determined by standard forces, such as technology 
and differences in factor endowments, and that environmental policy has no effect on this 
outcome. Therefore, under this view, referred to as the factor endowments hypothesis (and 
which pretty much resembles the HO model), capital abundant countries will tend to 
export capital-intensive goods, irrespective of differences in environmental regulations 
(Rutqvist, 2009).   
 Once again, we can use Copeland and Taylor's model (1994) to illustrate these 
competing theories using their basic set up but now assuming there are two regions in the 
world, North and South. These regions may have different factor endowments or pollution 
policy, but are otherwise identical. The authors apply a simple relative supply and demand 
analysis to determine autarky prices in each country, and illustrate in this way the 
interaction between factor endowments and pollution policy in determining the patterns of 
trade. 
Figure	  1	  -­‐	  Trade	  Liberalization	  
	  
Source (Copeland & Taylor, 1994) 
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Trade Liberalization
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 In their analysis, as can be seen in Figure 1, given their assumption that preferences 
over goods are homothetic and separable from environmental quality, the demand for X 
relative to Y is independent of income and can be written as RD(p), where RD’(p) < 0. 
Furthermore, the relative demand curve is the same in each country because preferences 
are identical across countries.  
 
 As for the supply side, the relative supply curves for each country can be written as 
a function of K/L and prices, exploiting constant returns to scale: 
 𝑅𝑆(𝑝, 𝜏,𝐾/𝐿) =    𝑥(𝑝, 𝜏,𝐾/𝐿, 1)𝑦(𝑝, 𝜏,𝐾  /  𝐿, 1)	  
 
 As can be seen, the relative supply curve is upward-sloping since increases in p raise 
the supply of X relative to Y. In addition, due to differences in factor endowments and 
pollution policy between North and South, their relative supply curves will also differ, as 
shown by the relative supply curves labelled RS and RS*. Autarky prices for each country 
are accordingly determined by the intersection of relative supply and demand curves, and 
we can then use these differences in autarky prices to infer the pattern of trade. This model 
can be used to consider the pollution haven and factor endowment hypotheses separately, 
and then consider how they interact. 
 
Factor	  Endowments	  Hypothesis	  
 
 Copeland and Taylor (1994) illustrate the factor endowments hypothesis with a 
model that can be seen in Figure 2. We take relative demand RD as presented previously. 
We also assume that pollution taxes are identical and exogenous across countries and that 
only relative factor endowments vary. Specifically, we have that North is relatively capital 
abundant so that K/L > K*/L*. South’s relative supply curve is shown in the figure as 
RS*. Since emission intensities are kept at the same level and being X the capital intensive 
good,  North’s relative supply curve RS is found to the right of South’s. Therefore, we 
could see how the relative price of X in autarky would be lower in the North than in the 
South. And so if we have the same emission intensities in both countries, then North, 
which is the country that is capital abundant, will export the capital-intensive but also more 
polluting good, and this will lead to an expansion of the polluting, capital-intensive industry 
in this country, making pollution rise. On the other hand, pollution goes down in the 
capital scarce country since the dirty good industry declines. 
 
 Therefore, the main point from the factor endowment hypothesis is that the impact 
of trade on the environment is determined by a country’s characteristics and production 
capabilities. Those countries that are relatively abundant in factors used in polluting 
industries will tend to get dirtier or more polluted as trade opens up, but countries that are 
relatively more abundant in factors used in the production of clean goods will get cleaner 
with trade. Consequently, as we will see in the following sections, the outcome suggested 
by this theory differs from those of the pollution haven hypothesis, since in the factor 
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endowments hypothesis if a low income country happens to be abundant in those factors 
used intensively in clean industries, then pollution will tend to fall as trade is liberalized. 
 
Figure	  2	  -­‐	  Factor	  Endowment	  Hypothesis	  
 
Source (Copeland & Taylor, 1994) 
 
Factor	  Endowments	  and	  Endogenous	  Policy	  	  
 
 However, we should take into consideration that higher income countries would 
probably have both a stricter pollution policy and also be characterized as capital abundant. 
Thus, while pollution policy will promote the import of dirty goods into the economy, 
capital abundance will tend to make this country a dirty good exporter. And so, ultimately 
the pattern of trade will depend on which of these effects is greater. If for example, relative 
factor endowment differences dominate relative income differences, then despite of having 
a stronger environmental regulation than the lower income country in the South, North 
will be exporting the dirty good (Copeland & Taylor, 2004).  
 
 Therefore, as explained by Taylor (2005), even though stricter environmental 
regulations contribute to a higher production costs for good X in the North, this can be 
offset by the relative abundance of factors used intensively in X. Hence, trade liberalization 
does not necessarily stimulate dirty industry migration from high income to low income 
countries, and it could even lead to an opposite effect. Similarly, this would mean that in 
cases in which the income elasticity of marginal damage is not too high in the North, and if 
this region is also sufficiently capital abundant, then trade could also lead to an increase in 
pollution in the North and a reduction in the South. However, if the income elasticity of 
marginal damage is high enough in the North, trade may decrease pollution both in the 
North and South.  
 
 Consequently, when the factor endowment effect dominates trade would actually 
promote production of the dirty good not in the country with weak pollution regulation 
but in the country where regulations are more stringent. In this case, the composition 
effect would tend to reduce global pollution. This is in contrasts with the pure pollution 
haven model where trade led to higher global pollution by moving production of dirty 
goods to countries with weak regulations, as we will see next. 
A
RS*
T*
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Figure 5
The Factor Endowments Hypothesis
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Pollution	  Haven	  Hypothesis	  
 
 When looking at the Pollution Haven Hypothesis, usually, the basic version of the 
model is set up by assuming that countries are identical if not for exogenous differences in 
pollution policy. For example, in some of the earlier work Pethig (1976) showed that 
countries with weaker regulation would export the polluting good, and he did this by 
making the assumption that countries differed only in exogenous emission intensities.  
 
 So to look at this case it is now important to make reference to Figure 1. Copeland 
and Taylor (1994) explain that we can think of North and South as initially identical, so that 
the two countries would have the same relative supply curve RS. Prices in autarky would be 
the same, and so these countries would have no incentive to trade. However, if we take 
into consideration the effect of weaker pollution policy in the South than North (τ* < τ), 
then South’s lower pollution tax will encourage production of X and contract Y because 
resources would be taken out of Y and put into X. Therefore, the country with the weaker 
environmental regulation produces relatively more X for any given p; and as seen in figure 
1, South’s relative supply curve will shift out to the right, as depicted by RS*. 
 
 From this, we could infer that the relative price of X in autarky is lower in the 
South than in the North, with pA* < pA, since the South has a comparative advantage in 
the dirty good industry. Because in the South pollution taxes are lower, relatively more of 
the polluting good is produced there, which brings down the autarky price and promotes 
trade. With trade, the North will import X from the South, and the South will import Y 
from the North. This expands dirty good production of X in the South and reduces it in 
the North. Pollution increases in the country with weak regulations, and falls in the country 
with strict regulations. In this way, a pollution haven is created in the country with weaker 
regulation thanks to trade being promoted by pollution policy differences (Copeland & 
Taylor, 1994). 
 
 The results shown by this basic pollution haven model are in line with some of the 
arguments of environmental advocates. North gains from trade by moving some of its 
production of dirty goods to the South. Furthermore, because polluting industries are 
shifted to the parts of the world with weaker environmental policy this tends to raise world 
pollution. 
 
The	  Pollution	  Haven	  Hypothesis	  with	  Endogenous	  Policy	  	  
 
 Most of the literature relates the disparities in environmental regulations between 
countries to their differences in income level, such as when comparing developed and 
developing countries. Therefore, we should notice that a weakness of pollution haven 
models with exogenous policy is that in these models pollution policies are not responsive 
to the changes in income level produced by trade. Although, these models could still be 
applied to look at a short run, its important to also look at the case where pollution policy 
is treated as endogenous and thus, as responsive to trade (Grether & Mathys, 2006).  
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 Copeland and Taylor (1994) also present a model dealing with this case. In this 
version of the model we consider two countries which vary only in the scale of their 
endowment vector, such that, K = λK* and L = λL*, where λ > 1. We also assume that 
each country has the same number of consumers, which is normalized to one, so increases 
in L should be thought of as an increase in the supply of effective labor. Therefore, 
North’s workers are more highly skilled than South’s but the ratio of capital to effective 
labor is the same in both. This means that North is richer than South, but because the K/L 
ratios are the same across countries, there is no incentive to trade in the absence of 
disparities in pollution policy. In addition, it is assumed that the regulator acts as a price 
taker in world goods markets when choosing pollution policy. Since environmental quality 
is treated as a normal good, the country with a higher income level would choose a higher 
pollution tax for a given good’s price, and it is these variations in environmental policy 
what would create an incentive to trade. Once again, this can be shown in figure 1. North 
and South have the same K/L ratio, but North’s higher income means that its pollution tax 
is higher, and so τ > τ∗. Therefore, North’s relative supply of X for any given p is to the 
left of South’s. North’s high income gives it a comparative advantage in the clean good. 
When trade is opened, North will export the clean good Y and import the dirty good X. 
Production in the polluting industry will be reduced in the North and will expand in the 
South, and so the low-income country becomes a pollution haven. 
 
 Therefore, the effects of trade on the environment can be inferred from this 
results. In the North, both the substitution and income effects of trade liberalization would 
lead to less pollution. However, in the South, pollution will increase as long as the income 
effect is not strong enough. At a global level, pollution can also increase with trade until the 
income effect becomes strong enough since the more polluting industries would move to 
the country with lax regulations. However, it is important to note that in this case since 
both North and South fully internalize pollution externalities, trade liberalization can be 
welfare increasing for both, and so variations in policy induced by income differences are 
an efficient source of comparative advantage (Copeland and Taylor, 2004). 
 
 In general, pollution haven models are consistent in their prediction that trade 
liberalization usually leads the country with lax regulation to export the dirty good. When 
we take policy as endogenous, these models show that lower income countries have weaker 
regulation, and thus, will export the dirty good. However, as mentioned, the final outcome 
of trade on pollution and welfare will vary according to the policy regime. In addition, we 
should also note that a major weakness of the pollution haven models is that they assume 
that differences in environmental regulation are the only incentive for trade. 
 
The	  Porter	  Hypothesis	  
 
 A contrasting view from the Pollution Haven Hypothesis is the theory referred to 
as the Porter Hypothesis, which suggests the presence of mechanisms that make stringent 
environmental policies in the home country promote greater efficiency and innovation, and 
thus, help to improve the domestic industries' comparative advantage. This theory was 
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proposed by Porter (1991) and Porter and van der Linde (1995) and the main idea is that 
part of the negative environmental consequences of an economic activity can be attributed 
to the inefficiency in the usage of inputs. Therefore, the authors argue that if stringent 
environmental regulation encourages firms to reduce pollution, and when planned in a way 
that it allows companies to innovate and improve efficiency, this can produce offsets by 
increasing productivity that can actually save more money than the compliance cost 
incurred and thus, improve comparative advantage (Rutqvist, 2009). Although not the 
focus of this study, it is important to mention this view since we can also find it being 
acknowledged in the empirical literature on trade and the environment, as we will see later 
in the paper.  
 
Gravity	  Models	  
 
 Another trade model that we should discuss, and that is frequently applied in the 
study of international trade, is the now popular gravity model. Anderson (2011) explains 
the origin of this model, which as the name suggests, is derived from Newton’s law of 
gravitational force and states that “the interaction between two geographic entities through 
trade is subject to forces that are inversely proportional to the distance or income 
differential between them and on some relevant measure of their ‘masses’, including 
population or market size, and income.” Anderson (2011) adds that gravity models also 
typically include other geographical controls, such as whether the country is landlocked and 
its distance to the equator, as well as other bilateral controls between countries such as a 
common border, common language, and colonial past. This author further explains that 
the central premise behind these models is that these structural features are likely to 
determine a country’s international trade patterns. These authors hold that many studies so 
far have confirmed that international trade is indeed subject to and driven by gravitational-
like forces. The model is clearly a useful starting point in applied international trade 
research. 
 
Environmental	  Kuznets	  Curve	  
 
 Finally, it is worth noticing that there have been many studies focusing on 
examining the link between incomes per capita and environmental quality. Among the 
main papers on this issue is the work by Grossman and Krueger (1994) on NAFTA, which 
led to many more studies on what has come to be known as the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve (EKC). The Environmental Kuznets Curve describes that there is an inverse-U 
relationship between per capita income level and the degree of environmental quality in a 
country, thus, according to this, increases in income are accompanied by increase in 
pollution levels in low income countries, but are seen to lead to a decline in pollution in 
high income countries. Since sometimes the argument that trade is, in all cases, good for 
the environment has been presented in policy circles, these findings play an important role 
in the discussion. However, there is also some skepticism about the existence of such a 
simple relationship between pollution and per capita income.  
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 Nevertheless, the EKC literature has played a key role in bringing about important 
questions about the dynamics of growth and the environment, and it has also shown that 
there is an income effect in which higher per capita income promotes an increase in the 
stringency of environmental regulation. Therefore, an analysis of the effects of trade and 
growth on the environment cannot be carried without taking into account policy 
responses. The link between income growth and the environment is important since 
treating pollution policy as endogenous and thus, as responsive to the changes in income 
level produced by trade can have an effect the expected results (Copeland & Taylor, 2004). 
 
2.2	  Summary	  on	  Theoretical	  Background	  
 
 Therefore, as can be seen from these theories, the effects of trade liberalization on 
both the local and global environment are contingent on the comparative advantage of 
countries, which we can consider to be determined jointly by differences in pollution policy 
as well as on other aspects, such as differences in factor endowments. Pollution havens will 
not be necessarily created in cases where the high income country is relatively abundant in 
the factors used intensively in pollution-intensive industries; and then trade may lead to 
both less pollution in low income countries, as well as a decrease in global pollution. So 
this means that differences in environmental regulations on their own do not imply dirty 
industries will shift production to low income countries as a result of trade.  Similarly, even 
if high income countries show a comparative advantage in polluting goods production 
based on their capital abundance, increases in the stringency of regulation may decrease 
this comparative advantage and lead to a reduction in polluting exports. This is one of the 
reasons why, as we will see, the empirical literature is usually more focused on the 
intermediate case referred to as the pollution haven effect.   
 
3.	  Literature	  Review	  
 
 Therefore, as seen the Heckscher–Ohlin model provides the basic theoretical 
foundations to the pollution haven hypothesis by showing that regions will export goods in 
which they have a comparative advantage. Empirically, the literature can be put together 
into three different groups that look at the effect of pollution regulation on trade flows. 
One of these is what can be seen as  a test of the existence of a pollution haven effect, in which 
authors check whether or not variations in environmental regulations between countries or 
regions have an effect on trade flows or on industry location decisions. A less flexible 
group is what we have referred to as the pollution haven hypothesis. Under this view, trade 
promotes the shift of dirty good production from strongly regulated countries to those 
with weak regulations, and so, in these cases the pollution haven effect is so strong that it 
completely overcomes other incentives for trade in polluting goods. A final group, and 
alternative view to the pollution haven hypothesis, is that patterns of trade in polluting 
goods are primarily determined by the standard determinants of comparative advantage, 
such as factor endowments and differences in technology (Levinson & Taylor, 2002).  
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 One of the main problems that authors have to face in this subject is that pollution 
and environmental data tend to be very limited; and so this issue has influence the 
evolution of the empirical literature. Many papers have chosen to focus on cases that look 
at the U.S. because of the availability of data. Also, studies of many important pollutants 
have been pretty much neglected, once again because of lack of data. Even worst is that 
this data scarcity is more evident in developing countries, whose study is more than 
necessary for a complete analysis of this issue. The main problem being that these 
countries do not count with well established methods for recording and monitoring 
environmental data. 
 
 So as mentioned, part of the literature has been focused on testing the existence of 
a pollution haven effect; and thus, seeing whether or not environmental regulations have 
an effect on trade flows, foreign direct investment decisions, or the location of production 
in certain industries. Work on this area can also be put into two groups. Most of the early 
work made use of cross-sectional data, by linking the cross sectional variation in trade or 
investment flows to industry, country, or region specific measures of regulatory costs and 
other determinants of trade and investment, such as factor costs. In this group of studies, 
most authors came to the conclusion that differences in environmental regulations between 
countries have no effect on trade and investment patterns. Later work on the same issue 
has taken into account the possible endogeneity of pollution policy and unobservable 
country specific characteristics that may also have an effect on trade an investment flows. 
Contrary to previous research, many of these studies have found that differences in 
environmental policy do have an effect on trade and investment patterns. In order to make 
a thorough review, we can take a quick look at the cross-sectional studies while pointing to 
some of the problems with this approach that have been highlighted in the literature, and 
then we can review more recent work. 
 
 As mention, the literature using trade data has been motivated by the Heckscher-
Ohlin (HO) model of international trade. In his study Tobey (1990) regressed cross-
country data  for a group of 23 countries of exports of polluting commodities, on country 
specific variables of factor endowments and environmental stringency. This author found 
the variable on environmental stringency to be an insignificant determinant of net export 
patterns. However, while this study has been cited quite often to argue against a link 
between environmental stringency and trade flows, it has also been criticized by other 
authors for basing these results on weak econometric grounds.  
 
 A different method, used by Grossman and Krueger (1994), has been to link the 
cross-sectional variation in trade flows to industry characteristics. Most of this work 
employs US data on the pattern of trade in manufactures as well as data on factor shares 
and pollution abatement costs. The general conclusion in this literature is that pollution 
abatement costs do not seem to explain the cross-sectional pattern of trade (Rutqvist, 
2009). As stated by Rutqvist (2009), some of these studies have even found a 
counterintuitive sign on the coefficient of abatement costs, which would point to a positive 
relationship between stronger regulation and exports. This result has often been interpreted 
as evidence in favor of the Porter hypothesis, which as previously mentioned, states that 
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stricter environmental regulation promotes technological innovation, and hence could 
either raise exports or lower imports. Other studies following this approach have also 
concluded that there is little connection between the stringency of environmental 
regulation and trade flows.  
 
 Nevertheless, more recent work suggests that there could be some issues with this 
approach that may have led to these results, such as the endogeneity of pollution 
abatement costs and unmeasured industry (or country) characteristics. For example, the 
literature poses a relationship between pollution abatement costs and imports conditional 
on some observable control variables, such as factor endowments or costs. However, there 
could be some unmeasured industry characteristic that creates co-movements in pollution 
abatement costs and imports and leads to some misinterpretation of the estimates. 
Similarly, we could also assume that dirty goods have relatively high transport costs, then 
the domestic industry would have a natural protection from imports. And so, if transport 
costs are not included in the estimation, then cross-sectional results could be biased. 
Likewise, we could face a problem of simultaneously, for example, if we take into 
consideration that trade and environmental regulations may be linked via governmental 
policy process (Mutafoglu, 2012). We can find studies that have directly made reference to 
these issues. For example, when looking at the case of NAFTA, Grossman and Krueger 
(1994) also found counter-intuitive signs for the pollution abatement cost variable in some 
regressions. Thus, the authors themselves pointed out to this strange signs and claimed that 
it may be arising from omitted variable bias. 
 
 Therefore, we can see how endogeneity and unobserved characteristics can lead to 
misleading results. More recent studies have made progress trying to address these 
concerns. Levinson and Taylor (2002) present a model with endogenous pollution policy to 
test for the effect of regulations on trade patterns. The results of their cross-section 
regressions with no correction for endogeneity showed that there is little relationship 
between net exports and pollution abatement cost; on the other hand, once they 
instrument for pollution abatement costs their results were completely changed, showing 
that stricter environmental regulations reduce net exports considerably. Likewise, 
Ederington and Minier (2003) study the link between pollution abatement costs and 
imports considering that these are determined simultaneously. They find a small, but 
statistically significant relationship between pollution control costs and imports.  
 
 Keller and Levinson (2002) use fixed effects estimation to show that environmental 
regulation has an effect on investment decisions, which also works as evidence that 
econometric problems could have led to the outcome of the previous literature. As done in 
earlier literature, they first estimate the results using a pooled OLS regression of foreign 
direct investment on abatement costs, without including state effects. These results indicate 
that FDI seems to be positively related with abatement costs. However, once they include 
state fixed effects they find that this same coefficient is negative and significant, which 
points to the presence of unobserved state-level variables driving the earlier results. 
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 Therefore, by making use of specific econometric strategies (such as instrumental 
variables and fixed effect estimation) in order to address the problems caused by 
endogeneity and unobserved characteristics, this later group of work presents an important 
turnaround of the earlier findings that pollution policy did not affect trade or investment, 
and thus, some evidence supporting the existence of a pollution haven effect. This 
evidence shows that after controlling for other factors that influence trade and investment 
flows more stringent environmental regulation acts as a deterrent to dirty good production. 
This paper will follow this same line of work to see whether the difference in 
environmental stringency between the group of Central American countries and the 
Dominican Republic (members of CAFTA), and their main trading partner, the US, has 
had an influence on the development of trade patterns. 
 
4.	  Trade	  and	  the	  Environment	  in	  Central	  America	  and	  
Dominican	  Republic	  
 
 This paper aims to contribute to this recent literature by evaluating the implications 
that environmental policy has had on trade flows during the initial period of liberalization 
that took place in the Central American Region and Dominican Republic during the 1990s.  
This section will provide some background information on the process of liberalization in 
this region as a point of reference. 
 
 It is known that FDI and trade liberalizations have played a key role in promoting 
industrialization in many developing countries and the Central American region has not 
been an exception to this fact. After trade liberalization and the implementation of 
structural reforms FDI inflows have increased significantly in the region, which has led to a 
pattern of international integration specially with the United States, who has become the 
leading destination for exports as well as the main source of foreign investment.  
 
 Since the 1980s, the Central American economies and the Dominican Republic 
have taken measures to promote integration in the global economy, ranging from structural 
adjustment programmes to foreign trade policies carried out through different trade 
agreements aimed at building up the conditions for access to international markets and 
stimulating exports (Cunha & Muthukumara, 2011). Since these countries have small 
domestic markets and relatively low consumption levels due to their income per capita, 
they promoted a process of regional integration as early as the 1960s, leading to the 
establishment of the Central American Common Market (CACM). Later, the region join 
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, so as to be able to gain access to the United States market 
who granted preferences to its members. These initiatives worked as foundations for the 
creation of export platforms for manufactures in the region. The growth of exports of 
manufactures in these countries has been mostly based on a labour-intensive model. For 
example, FDI was essential for the creation of the maquila industry and in more recent 
years to the development of the export of services (Desruelle & Schipke, 2008).  
	  	   19	  
 Trade liberalization is definitely the most important structural reform implemented 
in the last 30 years in these countries; however, we should note that the reform process in 
the region was not really coordinated and has occurred more or less selectively and slowly 
in each economy. Also, trade and investment flows were particularly low in the 1980s, 
mainly due to the civil conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. In this period, 
however, the countries initiated a process of diversification of exports in order to improve 
relations with the United States market. Both trade and FDI started to increase in the 
1990s with the end of the conflict in the region, but also specially in the wake of the 
investment opportunities from the privatization of public entities, a better business 
environment, and the new policies to promote FDI. In line with the process of 
liberalization, the countries in the region established legislation for the creation of export 
promotion regimes that included tax and subsidies granted for export performance. In 
addition, free zone areas were created where companies could operate as offshore 
enterprises for taxes and customs (Desruelle & Schipke, 2008). 
 
 In addition, to have an idea of the environmental background of the countries in 
our study, it would be beneficial to carry a review on the recent environmental 
developments on these countries. From this review we will be able to see that while the 
region has made some progress in the management and protection of the environment, lots 
of improvements are still needed. Cunha and Muthukumara (2011) provide valuable 
information on some of these countries.  
 
1. Costa Rica 
 
 Since 1991, Costa Rica has made substantial progress in the development of 
institutions and organizations that look out for the environment. In 1995, the Ministry of 
the Environment and Energy was created and a new General Environmental Law was also 
approved in the country. This law declared air as a common property and gave the state the 
authority to protect the environment and control pollution. In addition, the Act provided 
guidelines, mechanisms, and established the legal framework for the sustainable 
management of natural resources and for the protection of the environment. For example, 
after this law many institutions and entities that work in specific areas related to the 
environment and climate change have been created. Also, it is worth mentioning, the 
Forestry Act, created in 1996, which determines the role of the state to ensure the 
conservation, protection and appropriate management of forests; the Biodiversity Act and 
the Land Use Management and Conservation Act, both established in 1998. In more recent 
years, after the establishment of the DR- CAFTA, the environment agenda in Costa Rica 
has been described as very ambitious and one of the most advanced among developing 
countries. For example, the government aspires to become carbon-neutral by 2021, though 
it still has do deal with limitations associated to the rise in energy prices and population 
pressures. Overall, Costa Rica needs to maintain its efforts on preventing deforestation and 
lost of biodiversity, while also trying to strengthen environmental controls and evaluations. 
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2. El Salvador 
 
 Since liberalization, El Salvador has also progress in strengthening its institutional 
capacity to tackle environmental and natural resource issues. The Ministry of the 
Environment and Natural Resources and the country’s Environmental Law (LMA) were 
created in 1998. The LMA is the foundation of the country’s regulations in terms of the 
environment and it assigns the Council of Ministers with the responsibility of the 
maintenance of environmental policy. In 2000, the Council established a National Policy 
on Strategic Guidelines on the Environment, which promotes a view towards 
Environmental Balance, Joint Responsibility and Public Interest. The LMA establishes the 
functions and administrative powers of the Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources (MARN), the National Environmental Management System (SINAMA) and 
other government institutions. The key instrument of the LMA is a system of permits that 
requires any new project to present an Environmental Impact Assessments. In addition, 
the government has passed the Conservation of Wildlife Law (1999) and the Forestry Law 
(2002). More recently, in 2004 and in line with CAFTA negotiations, the government 
presented a national development plan which included a new environmental strategy 
referred to as “Environment: Legacy for Future Generations,” promoting the preservation 
of natural resources, and efficient management of water reserves, and disposal of solid 
wastes. The government has also established an Environmental Superintendency in order 
to prevent and manage any environmental risk and land degradation.  
 
3. Honduras 
 
 Honduras has also created several institutions and organizations to manage natural 
resources and protect the environment. In 1993, the General Law for the Environment 
was created, which establishes that protecting, preserving, and managing the environment 
and natural resources is an issue of public interest, and that the state and local governments 
should encourage a rational use and sustainable management of resources. Honduras has 
entered into more than 60 international environmental treaties and protocols, at a global 
and regional level. The country’s has worked on strengthening its legal and regulatory 
frameworks to address issues such as management of water resources, protected areas, and 
forests; pollution control; environmental health; and rural development. Among the more 
recent national policies related to the environment it is worth mentioning: Honduras 
Environmental Policy (2005); Agriculture and Rural Environment, (2005); Environmental 
Mainstreaming (2005); and Simplification and Decentralization of Environmental 
Management (2002). Furthermore, the National System of Environmental Information 
(SINIA), formed in 1993, is accountable for developing databases, maintaining geographic 
information systems, and indicators on environmental issues. 
 
4. Nicaragua 
 
 In 1994, Nicaragua established the Ministry of the Environment and Natural 
Resources (MARENA) aiming towards the design, organization and administration of 
environmental policy. Later the General Law on Environment and Natural Resources was 
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the passed by the government, which became the basis of the environmental legal and 
regulatory framework in this country. MARENA is responsible for the administration of 
the National Protected Areas System, the implementation of Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), management of the National Environmental Information System 
(SINIA) and the organization of response systems and disaster prevention measures 
together with the National System for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response 
(SINAPRED). In 2002, the government also passed the Law on Exploration of 
Geothermal Resources, and the Law on the Promotion of Hydropower. As for water 
resources management, in 2007, the National Council on Potable Water and Sanitation 
(CONAPAS) announced a comprehensive sector strategy for the country's water and in 
2008 the National Water Law was passed by the government. The Ministry of Natural 
Resources (MARENA) has established regulations in several areas, such as preservation 
and productive use of water resources, protected land and marine areas, national 
reforestation campaigns, sustainable land management, control and reduction of pollution, 
solid waste management, mitigation and adaptation to climate change, and education on 
environmental issues.  
 
 As mentioned by Cunha and Muthukumara (2011), even with this list of 
achievements there are still many weak areas in terms of an efficient and rational use of the 
environment and natural resources in the region. Areas in need of improvement include 
information and data availability on natural resources and the environment; institutional 
operations; coordination between environmental authorities and other agencies; regulatory 
instruments; and monitoring and implementation mechanisms.  
5.	  Empirical	  Strategy	  
 
 The aim of this section is to develop a model of how trade is influenced by the 
laxity or stringency of the environmental regulation in a country. We postpone to the next 
section of the paper the issue of the econometrics of estimating the model and testing 
hypotheses. 
 
 The theoretical background provided in our first section will guide us in developing 
an empirical model of trade determination. For this task, we have to consider two issues:  
1) what are the determinants of trade, including as we are assuming, the stringency of 
environmental regulation.; 2) how to deal with the difficulties posed by the measurement of 
the stringency of environmental regulation.  
 
 As for the determinants of trade, following our discussion on international trade 
models, the literature suggest the use of the gravity model framework as a useful starting 
point in applied international trade research. Therefore, in order to avoid erroneously 
attributing variations in bilateral trade flows to our two effects of interest (environmental 
stringency and factor endowments), our empirical specification will also include a set of 
other control variables suggested by the gravity model framework. One benefit usually 
acknowledged of the gravity model over other methods is that it takes advantage of the 
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variety of information contained in bilateral trade flows. These controls include: Distance (𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,!) ; the extent of the Potential Market (𝑀𝐾𝑇  !" =   𝑙𝑛(𝐺𝐷𝑃!   ∗   𝐺𝐷𝑃!)) ; 
Importer Trade Openness (  (𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠!   +    𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠!)/𝐺𝐷𝑃!); Exporter Trade Openness ((𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠!   +    𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠!)/𝐺𝐷𝑃!). We should point out that the gravity model also mentions 
the addition of other controls variables, such as common religion, common language, and 
landlockedness; however, in this case these have not been included since all Central 
American countries share the same characteristics in these respects and thus, we would 
have no variation in the data. 
 
 In addition to these variables, as stipulated in the basic Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) 
model, trade is also determined by differences in factor endowments. Hence, to account 
for this we include a proxy for differences in endowments between the importing and 
exporting country. For our sample of countries, we could only obtain data on aggregate 
capital and labour, so we included the difference in capital-labour ratios for each respective 
country compare to the US (∆𝐾𝐿!"   =   𝑙𝑛[!"!!"!  ]). 
 
 Finally, to test for the presence of the Pollution Haven Effect we need to include a 
measure of the difference in the stringency of environmental regulations between the 
countries, which brings us to our second issue: how to deal with the difficulties of finding 
proper data. The problem with this issue is not only about collecting the appropriate data, 
but also of figuring out what kind of data could represent environmental regulation 
stringency. This variable should give us some reference of how much more costly 
production is in a given area relative to others due to environmental regulations. However, 
these environmental compliance costs could take many forms, such as environmental fees 
or taxes, permitting costs, emissions limits that require installation of some special 
technology, lawsuits, product or process redesign, forgone output, among others. 
(Copeland and Taylor, 2004). Some studies have tried to measure these costs by creating 
indices that weight several country characteristics such as the budget of environmental 
agencies in the country, public awareness of environmental issues, the number of 
environmental treaties the country has joined, or other general indicators. A review of the 
literature shows how some authors claim that these indices of stringency can be considered 
somewhat subjective, hard to interpret, and are typically not available for that many 
countries (Javorcik & Wei, 2004). Other studies have used measurements of pollution 
directly, reasoning that, for example, high sulphur emissions are evidence of lax regulations. 
 
 This study then faces a similar difficulty to that found in other studies of the 
environment, the task of quantifying the strictness of environmental regulations. One 
approach could be to look at the number of Multilateral Environmental Agreements that 
the countries have joined. The disadvantage with this method is that we cannot really 
ensure whether these agreements are actually enforced. One thing is to have rules 
established, but another is to actually abide by them.   
 
 Hence, to address this difficult task, we narrowed our choice to environmental 
measures that show both within-country and between-country variation, as this will be 
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necessary features for our estimation. Choices were limited, but we selected as a proxy for 
the level of environmental stringency a measure of the grams of lead-content per gallon of 
gasoline, which in our model will be included as the differences in the lead content of 
gasoline between the exporting and importing countries (∆𝐿𝐸𝐴𝐷  !" =   𝑙𝑛 !"#$!!"#$! ). This 
measure is a market-share weighted sum of the maximum lead content of different 
gasolines that has been used by other authors, such as Damania et al (2003); Fredriksson et 
al (2005); and Cole et al (2006).  This variable has a number of features that make it 
appealing as a measure of environmental regulations. Cole et al (2006) discuss that some of 
these features include: 1) that the content of lead in gasoline is almost entirely a policy 
decision that is unlikely to be influenced by other factors; 2) that lead emissions are 
precursors to damaging local air pollutants with significant health implications. As a result, 
the control of these emissions is usually done as an early environmental objective during a 
country’s development. In addition, Damania et al (2003) report that lead-content 
regulation has a statistically significant correlation with other measures of environmental 
regulations (public environmental R&D expenditures as a proportion of GDP; and per 
capita membership of environmental organizations). Therefore, a country with relatively 
strict environmental regulations would allow smaller levels of lead content per gallon of 
gasoline. As for its measurement, the average has been calculated by using different types 
of gasoline and weighting them by their market share. 
 
 Whichever proxy is used for the stringency of environmental policy pollution 
emissions and environmental regulations are expected to be negatively correlated. 
Furthermore, the pollution haven hypothesis would suggest that environmental regulations 
and trade are also negatively correlated. Consequently, if the pollution-haven hypothesis 
holds, then emissions and trade would be positively correlated, and thus, we would expect 
this variable to be positive. 
 
 Therefore, the approach in this study will be to apply a variation of the gravity 
model to panel data in order to investigate the relationship between environmental 
regulations and exports (X) from the Central American countries, and the Dominican 
Republic, to the US. This model will try to account for factor endowment effects; it will 
include a proxy for environmental stringency to account for the pollution haven effect; and 
as well as other standard controls usually applied in gravity models.  
 
 𝑋!,!,! = 𝑓 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦!,!,! , 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒  𝐾/𝐿  𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!,!,! , 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡!,!,!  𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! , 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠!,!,𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟  𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒  𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠!,! ,𝑍!,!,! 	  
 
 
 Let then subscripts i and j refer to the exporting and importing countries 
respectively, and subscript t refers to time. We follow a specification of the gravity model 
that includes a set of country fixed effects. With this specification the country dummies can 
control for all determinants of bilateral trade that are country-specific, such as income, 
population, infrastructure or any other omitted country-specific effects that can have an 
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influence on trade volumes. This method can be very useful in our case since this lets us 
put more attention on those variables that are more relevant for the analysis of trade and 
the environment.  
 
5.1	  Data	  	  
 
 This exercises will focus on exports directed towards the United States from six 
countries, which include the Central American countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Guatemala, and Nicaragua); and also the Dominican Republic. It will cover an 
10-year period (1990–1999).  
  
 As for the sources, the OECD Statistical Database provides data on exports by 
partner country to each of the OECD member countries. Capital and labour endowment 
data are extracted from World Bank, Employment Lab - Diagnostic Toolbox. Distance 
between two countries is found on the CEPR website. The World Development Indicators 
is the source of country data on: GDP, and Importer and Exporter's Trade Openness 
Ratio. Data on average years of education was obtained from Barro and Lee Data Set on 
Educational Attainment (updated on 2013). Finally, the database for the maximum lead 
content in gasoline has been elaborated (and kindly shared) by Grether and Mathys (2002) 
on the basis of Octel's Worldwide Gasoline Survey.  
5.2	  Methodologies	  
 
 As mentioned before, econometric studies of the pollution haven hypothesis have 
typically followed a reduced form regressions of some measure of economic activity on 
some measure of regulatory stringency and other variables: 
 Y! = αR! + X!B! + e! 
 
where Y is a measure of economic activity, R is environmental regulations stringency, X is 
a set of other variables that will determine Y, and e is the error term. The pollution haven 
hypothesis is that estimates of  !!!! will be negative (α<0). The empirical literature contains a 
variety of implementations of this equation. Some studies focus on foreign direct 
investment. Other studies focus on international trade, where Y represents, for example, 
exports (Levinson & Taylor, 2002). 
 As pointed out previously, finding an appropriate measure of environmental 
regulations stringency is not simple, but even when it might be possible to find some 
suitable measure to proxy for regulatory stringency, it is important to consider that for 
OLS to give consistent estimators the error term must be unrelated to the regressors, and 
this is often not an assumption that can be made. As seen before, an issue that is 
mentioned in the literature is that economic activity and pollution regulations may be 
determined simultaneously. In theory the solution to this problem is to use instrumental 
variables. Nevertheless, in practice this means finding instruments for a variable of 
environmental regulations stringency that is difficult to measure, and in the panel structure 
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it means finding something that changes over time, shows correlation with R!", and is not 
correlated with e!". Thus, finding a valid and strong instrument is often very hard. 
 Nevertheless, in order to pursue consistent, unbiased and efficient estimates, we 
will carry out our estimation using instrumental variables. Consistent with the literature, we 
seek instruments which are uncorrelated with the errors but are correlated with the variable 
use to proxy for regulatory stringency. We have chosen to include as instruments all 
exogenous variables in our model and four external exogenous variables: 1) average years 
of schooling; 2) health expenditure as a percentage of government expenditure; 3) 
protected area as a percentage of total territorial area; and 4) the number of tuberculosis 
cases per 100,000 habitants (data for these variables comes from The World Development 
Indicators). These external exogenous variables are unlikely to be correlated with the error 
but are indicative of a general level of social consciousness in the country, which is likely to 
accompany strict environmental regulations. 
 There is a further econometric issue that should be considered, which as mentioned 
before, is that some unobserved characteristics of the countries that are being studied are 
likely to be correlated with both economic activity and regulatory stringency (Copeland and 
Taylor, 2004). This means that R and the error term, e, would be correlated, and thus our 
estimates will be biased.  
 The solution found in the literature for the problem of unobserved heterogeneity is 
to estimate a panel-data version of the  previous equation, and include fixed effects by 
country: 
 Y!" = v! + αR!" + X′B!" + e!"	  
 
 These fixed effects v! capture the unobserved characteristics of countries that make 
them likely to have both strict environmental regulations and high levels of economic 
activity. However, this also means that including fixed effects requires panel data on 
regulatory stringency. 
 A fixed effect model examines whether intercepts vary across groups or time 
periods. If individual effect v! does not exist v! = 0, then OLS would produce efficient and 
consistent parameter estimates. However, if individual effect v!  is not zero in longitudinal 
data, heterogeneity or individual specific characteristics that are not captured in regressors 
may cause a problem for estimation (Stock & Watson, 2009). Then panel data models 
provide a way to deal with these problems. 
 There are several strategies for estimating a fixed effect model. The least squares 
dummy variable model (LSDV) uses dummy variables. This method is widely used because 
it is relatively easy to estimate and interpret. However, LSDV can becomes problematic in 
a short panel setting in which we have to include a large number of dummy variables, and 
so our estimation loses degrees of freedom. On the contrary, in cases where there is a long 
panel setting, with only a few individuals and more time periods, LSDV can be the 
preferred method for estimation (Stock & Watson, 2009). This is useful in our case since 
we are looking only at a few countries in particular.  
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 Thus, in line with the later group of empirical work on this issue, we will make use 
of econometric strategies such as instrumental variables and fixed effect estimation in order 
to address the problems caused by endogeneity and unobserved characteristics. 
6.	  Results	  
 
 On the modelling stage, we can begin with pooled OLS and then evaluate the 
potential problems if unobserved heterogeneity is not taken into account. We can deal with 
heterogeneity by adding individual specific intercepts using a fixed effect model. Next, we 
should conduct instrumental variables estimation to appropriately account for the possible 
endogeneity of environmental regulations, remembering to implement formal tests to 
examine the validity of our instruments.   
 
*p-values in parentheses 
Pooled&OLS Fixed&Effects&(LSDV) IV
0.312 0.142 0.346
(0.223) (0.175) (0.032)
,0.039 ,7.113 ,7.016
(0.940) (0.010) (0.003)
2.086 0.387 0.868
(0.000) (0.474) (0.193)
,0.039 ,1.747 ,1.938
(0.978) (0.192) (0.093)
5.092 6.048 5.580
(0.128) (0.014) (0.014)
,0.075
(0.976)
,90.378 ,31.056 ,48.015
(0.026) (0.045) (0.019)
,2.335 ,2.513
(0.021) (0.004)
,8.653 ,8.763
(0.007) (0.001)
,7.302 ,7.219
(0.014) (0.005)
,7.570 ,7.381
(0.010) (0.004)
,9.790 ,9.189
(0.006) (0.003)
F,Statistic 27.88 38.94 ,
Wald9Chi2 , , 448.19
R,squared 0.538 0.828 0.823
Root9MSE 1.245 0.790 0.725
N9(Total9Observations) 60 60 60
T9(time) 10 10 10
N9(countries) 6 6 6
Co39,9El9Salvador
Co49,9Guatemala
Co59,9Honduras
Co69,9Nicaragua
Distance
Constant9/Co1(Costa9Rica)
Relative9Capital,Labour9Ratio
Potential9Market
Exporter9Trade9Openness
Importer9Trade9Openness
Co29,9Dominican9Republic
Relative9Pollution9Stringency
Table&:&Regression&Results
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6.1	  Statistical	  Analysis	  
 
 Pooled OLS estimation is a pooled linear regression without any type of fixed (or 
random) effects. It assumes a constant intercept and slopes regardless of having different 
individuals (Stock & Watson, 2009). Therefore, in our case the pooled OLS estimation 
posits no difference in intercept and slopes across countries. 
 
 We summarize the estimation of our model in Tables I, which includes results from 
the different estimation methods. First, Table I shows the OLS estimate does not exactly 
give us much to work with; although it shows a F-statistic of 27.88 and p<0.000, most of 
the coefficients are not statistically significant, including our variables of interest. The R-
squared of 0.5378 says that this model accounts for 53.8 percent of the total variance in net 
exports.  
 
 Thus, as mentioned, we may suspect the need to include individual specific effects 
to deal with the heterogeneity or country individual effects that may or may not be 
observed. Then, let us examine fixed group effects by introducing country dummy 
variables. We can notice that five group dummies, Co2-Co6, are added to the pooled OLS 
equation; one of six dummies, Co1 in this case, was excluded from the regression equation 
in order to avoid perfect multicollinearity. The Fixed Effect (LSDV) estimation fits the 
data a bit better than does pooled OLS. The F statistic increased from 27.88 to 38.94 
(p<0.000); and the R-squared increased from 0.5378 to .8277. We can also notice that 
parameter estimates of individual regressors are quite different from those in the pooled 
OLS; although, most remain not statistically significant with the exception of our factor 
endowment variable, which can now be considered statistically significant at a 10% level. 
Therefore, we can see that there are some difference between the pooled OLS and Fixed 
Effect. Estimation by Fixed Effects (LSDV) improved all goodness-of-fit measures like F-
test, root MSE, and R-squared significantly, but lost 5 degrees of freedom by adding five 
group dummies. Overall, Fixed Effects seems to be a bit better than the pooled OLS. 
 
 Table I also shows the instrumental variables estimate (IV). The OLS estimate 
involves the observed measures of our pollutant indicator, the maximum lead content of 
gasoline, whereas the instrumental variables estimate uses the fitted values of this measure 
in estimating our model. The two estimates show very different results, which illustrates 
the importance of using instrumental variables. It also suggests the importance of choosing 
the right instruments. 
 
 As noted, to have valid instruments these must be correlated with the endogenous 
regressors but uncorrelated with the error term. Below, we present a test for judging the 
explanatory power of the instruments in our study. This table shows a test for the joint 
significance of all of the instruments. We can see that they are jointly significantly different 
from zero, with a p-value of 0.000. In addition, the partial R-squared is 0.294. It has been 
suggested that an F statistic around 10 is required to consider that the instruments are 
sufficiently strong (Stock & Watson, 2009). Our value of 9.728 is quite close to this 
	  	   28	  
requirement, so in the lack of better instruments at the time we chose to work with these 
variables 
 
	  
 
 As for the estimation by instrumental variables, overall, results are encouraging. 
First, the variables of interest show the expected signs for this specification, and are also 
significant. So, contrary to estimates by OLS and Fixed Effects, the variable that accounts 
for the stringency of environmental regulations "Relative Pollution Stringency" now 
becomes significant through the instrumentation. Therefore, since as noted by the 
literature there is always the likelihood of endogeneity, we would rely on the results 
obtained by IV estimation.  
 
 We can begin the discussion with the pollution variable since this is the main 
purpose for our study. The impact of environmental regulation on trade relies on the 
significance of the stringency measure and the sign of its coefficient. Our results show that 
the variable "Relative Pollution Stringency" is positive at the 5% significance level. We 
should remember that according to a priori expectation this variable is negatively related to 
environmental regulations. These regulations, in turn, are supposed to be negatively related 
to trade. Thus, the positive and significant coefficient on the "Relative Pollution 
Stringency" variable provides evidence of the pollution-haven effect. Thus, it would appear 
that trade patterns are affected by the stringency of environmental regulations. 
 
 In addition, our variable for the "Relative Capital-Labor Ratio," which represents 
factor endowment differences, is statistically significant at a 1% level and shows the 
expected sign. Hence, it seems that differences in the costs of inputs also significantly 
factor into the decision to trade. "Importer trade openness" is likewise statistically 
significant at a 5% level, but this is contrary to "Exporter trade openness" which besides 
being significant only at a 10% level, also shows a counterintuitive sign. On this 
specification "Potential Market" shows little evidence of being significant, though, it does 
have the expected sign.  
 
6.2	  Economic	  Interpretation	  
 
 As for the interpretation of these results, we can see that if the other trade 
determinants (factor endowment, potential market size, trade openness, etc.)  are held 
constant across the exporting countries, those countries with relatively lax environmental 
regulations will end up having higher exports. It may be a bit difficult to understand the 
quantitative inference of our finding. However, an intuitive interpretation could be given in 
terms of our proxy, the differences in the lead content of gasoline, as the following: if a 
host country relaxes its environmental regulation such that the difference in the lead 
Table&'&First&Stage&Regression&Summary&Statistics
Variable R'Sq Adjusted&R'Sq Partial&R'Sq Robust&F Prob&>&F
0.659 0.563 0.294 9.728 0.000Lead/Ratio
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content of gasoline with that of the US increases by 1%, on average it will be able to 
increase its exports to this country by 0.35% that otherwise the case. In terms of economic 
significance, we might not considered this effect so substantial, but it is also not negligent 
since for example, in terms of average GDP for our group of countries during the period 
of study, it would have meant that a 10% increase in the difference in the lead content of 
gasoline with that of the US would have led in average to a 0.58% greater GDP.  
7.	  Conclusion	  
 
 A controversial issue debated in recent years is whether disparities in environmental 
regulations between countries are turning developing economies into pollution havens. The 
basic argument is that stringent environmental policy in developed countries is promoting 
production of polluting goods in developing countries where regulation is usually weaker. 
Since pollution-intensive industries will have a bigger incentive to transfer production to 
these countries, a haven of these industries will be created. A related claim is that 
developing countries may deliberately reduce environmental standards, in order to attract 
more firms and increase exports. This could produce a "race to the bottom” with countries 
lowering environmental standards to achieve this. 
 
 Early empirical literature has typically concluded that environmental stringency has 
no apparent effect on trade flows. However, most of these early studies used cross 
sectional data, so they did not control for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and 
usually treated pollution regulations as exogenous. But, if as suggested by theory, pollution 
regulations are in fact endogenous or if there are important omitted factors, then the 
estimated results would be misleading. Instead, a group of recent studies has found that 
both trade and investment are influenced by pollution regulations. This is a major 
turnaround from the previous consensus that environmental policy did not affect trade and 
investment flows. Several recent studies have addressed the issues of endogeneity and 
unobserved characteristics and found evidence for the existence of a pollution haven 
effect. Hence, this later group of work shows the benefits of combining theory and 
empirical work.  
 
 This paper contributes to the debate on trade and the environment by adding to 
this recent literature. The primary objective of this study has been to evaluate the effect of 
the stringency of environmental policy on the patters of international trade focusing on 
how exports to the United States, from Central American countries: Costa Rica, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua; and also the Dominican Republic, are 
influenced by the environmental regulations of these countries. Our theoretical framework 
builds upon basic models used in the topic of international trade and the environment, 
such as the HO model, Copeland and Taylor’s (2004) model, and the Gravity model. From 
this, we derive an econometric approach based on the use of fixed effects and instrumental 
variables estimation in order to account for the problems of endogeneity and unobserved 
characteristics mentioned in the literature.   
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 Our results show that after controlling for other factors that influence trade flows 
more stringent environmental regulation works as a deterrent to production of polluting 
goods. The statistical evidence suggests that there exists a negative relationship between 
exports to the US and the relative stringency of environmental regulation of Central 
American countries and the Dominican Republic. In general, lax environmental policy 
tends to promote an increase in exports to the US. To appropriately interpret these 
findings, we should keep in mind that the environmental variable is only one of the 
determinants of trade. Therefore, it would not be correct to conclude that environmental 
policy alone can determine the patterns of trade. Consequently, the evidence presented 
supports the existence of a pollution haven effect, not the more strict pollution haven 
hypothesis.  
 
 A final point to note is that, as further research, it would be interesting to extend 
this study to the more recent period of the 2000's onward, since important trade trade 
agreements have been established in the region during this period. This was not possible in 
our case, as it was intended initially, due to lack of data on environmental variables which 
as mention is one of the main problems for studies on the subject. 
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